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Abstract 
This article examines the United Kingdom’s negotiating position on the revision of the 
EU Coordinating Regulations, proposed by the European Commission in December 
2016, in the context of Brexit and the negotiations on the Withdrawal Agreement. The 
Withdrawal Agreement contains provisions on the future coordination of social security 
for UK and EU nationals who have exercised their freedom of movement rights before 
the end of the Transition period. The coordination envisaged by the Withdrawal 
Agreement has not been sealed at the point of the UK’s departure but will continue to 
evolve and incorporate future changes in the EU Coordinating Regulations, including 
the reforms contained in the Commission’s current legislative proposal. The UK had a 
seat at the negotiating table until it left the European Union on 31 January 2020, which 
it used to try to influence the reform of the Coordinating Regulations to reflect its future 
interests. The article finds that while the UK participated in negotiating the current 
revision of the Coordinating Regulations and several of the revisions are in line with 
its aims, its influence is waning as the UK moves from being a rule maker to a rule 
taker in Europe.  
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1 Introduction 
 
In a referendum on 23 June 2016 the United Kingdom (UK) voted by a very narrow 
margin to leave the European Union (EU).1 Almost one year later, on 29 March 2017, 
the UK Government invoked Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union2 to initiate the 
process of leaving, which, after three extensions, took place on 31 January 2020.  In 
December 2016, between the referendum and the UK Government invoking Article 50 
of the Treaty, the European Commission presented a legislative proposal3 to revise 
the social security coordinating regulations - Regulation (EC) No. 883/20044 and its 
implementing regulation, Regulation (EC) No. 987/2009.5 If adopted, the new 
Regulation is expected to take effect in 20226 and thus the amendments are unlikely 
to apply before the UK leaves the Acquis Communautaire7 which, at the time of writing 
(April 2020) is scheduled to be at the end of the Transition period8 on 31 December 
2020. However, the Withdrawal Agreement9 published on 17 October 2019 and signed 
on 24 January 2020 contains provisions on the future coordination of social security 
for UK and EU nationals who have exercised their freedom of movement rights before 
the end of the Transition period. The coordination of social security envisaged by the 
Withdrawal Agreement is not sealed at the point of the UK’s departure but is dynamic 
and will incorporate future changes to the Coordinating Regulations, which will include 
the reforms contained in the Commission’s current legislative proposal. Thus, given 
the time that pensions take to mature, the Coordinating Regulations are likely to apply 
to the UK for very many years to come. With this in mind the UK participated in the 
negotiations to revise the Coordinating Regulations while at the same time negotiating 
the Withdrawal Agreement.  
This article examines the UK’s negotiating positions on the proposed revision of the 
Coordinating Regulations in the context of Brexit and the negotiations on the 
Withdrawal Agreement. The analysis is based on examination of EU and UK 
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documentation, including iterations of the Withdrawal Agreement and reports 
considered by the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee,10 informed by 
interviews during an on-going longitudinal study11 of Brexit and social security 
coordination with senior policy makers12 involved with both the negotiations on Brexit 
and the negotiations on reform of the Coordinating Regulations (hereafter referred to 
as ‘participants’) in five EU member countries – Austria, Finland, Poland, Spain, the 
United Kingdom - between July 2017 and July 2019.13 The selection of countries is 
purposive based upon migration stocks and flows,14 and social security systems.15 
The study finds that while the UK participated in negotiating the current revision of the 
Coordinating Regulations, and several of the adjustments to the original proposal are 
in line with its aims, it has made compromises because it is leaving the EU and its 
influence is perceived by other member countries to have already waned as the UK 
moves from being an influential rule maker to a rule taker in Europe. The study 
contributes to the literature on EU law and policy making on coordination of social 
security;16 Brexit and social security;17 and the UK and EU’s approaches to the 
negotiations of the Withdrawal Agreement18 and revision of the Social Security 
Coordinating Regulations. 
2  Evolution of the Coordinating Regulations 
 
EU member countries’ social security schemes are coordinated to reduce obstacles 
to free movement that national social security rules might otherwise present. The 
House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee noted in February 2017 that “The 
current rules on the coordination of social security at EU-level are the product of long 
and complex negotiations stretching back to the earliest days of the European 
Economic Community.” 19 Originally provided for workers by the Treaty of Rome20 and 
given effect on 1 January 1959 by Regulations 3/5821 and 4/5822 to support free 
movement of labour, the Regulations employ four principle mechanisms23 to 
coordinate social security in the context of free movement: ‘Equal treatment’ prohibits 
discrimination on nationality grounds; rules determine which country is responsible for 
collecting contributions, determining eligibility and administering benefits and services; 
periods of residence and social insurance spent in different EU member countries are 
aggregated to establish benefit entitlement; and territorial boundaries are removed to 
make some benefits exportable to other member countries.24  
 
Since 1959, the Coordinating Regulations have been reformed on two occasions and 
continually revised to respond and adjust to Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) case law and the member countries’ evolving social security systems. The first 
revision came in 1972 when Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/7125 and its implementing 
regulation, Regulation (EEC) No. 574/7226 replaced Regulations 3/58 and 4/58 after 
long negotiations described by one participant as ‘Très, très, très, très, très dures’.27 
 
Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 was a more sophisticated development of Regulation 
3/58 that extended both the material and personal scope of Coordination.28 Regulation 
1408/71 was revised almost annually in response to the continually evolving social 
security systems of the member countries and plethora of judgments of the CJEU, with 
the reactive ad hoc revisions increasing complexity and uncertainty for administrators 
and mobile workers alike. At the Edinburgh Council in 1992, a proposal was made to 
“modernise and simplify” the Regulations in order to make coordination “more efficient 
and user-friendly” and to take account of developments in social security schemes and 
4 
 
case law.29 After what were again long and difficult negotiations, Regulation (EC) No. 
883/200430 and its implementing regulation, Regulation (EC) No. 987/200931 became 
effective on 1 May 2010. The reform again extended the material and the personal 
scope of coordination, the latter to all persons, including non-economically active 
people covered by a scheme.32 The House of Commons European Scrutiny 
Committee stated in February 2017 that the Coordinating Regulations’ “impact on the 
lives of individual citizens is profound, as they provide a measure of legal and financial 
clarity about their rights and obligations if they move between Member States.” 33  
 
3 Coordination of Social Security in the Withdrawal Agreement 
 
3.1 The process of withdrawal 
Nine months after the referendum, the UK notified the European Council of its intention 
to leave the EU and withdrawal negotiations began on 19 June 2017.34 The European 
Commission was appointed by the European Council to negotiate the Withdrawal 
Agreement on behalf of the EU27 in the two-phase negotiations. Phase 1 comprised 
three issues - Financial settlement, the Irish border and Citizens’ rights (which include 
free movement and social security coordination) considered by the Council to be 
priorities on which sufficient progress had to be reached before proceeding to Phase 
2 which covered the post-Brexit and Transitional relationship. 
 
After six rounds of discussions, on 8 December 2017, an agreement was reached in 
principle on the three priority areas. On 28 February 2018, a draft Withdrawal 
Agreement was published and three weeks later, on 19 March 2018, a further version 
with the areas that had been agreed highlighted in green.35  The entire section on 
social security coordination was highlighted to denote agreement had been reached. 
With minor amendments, the March draft of the section on social security coordination 
was included in the draft Withdrawal Agreement36 published on 14 November 2018 
and endorsed, together with a brief Political Declaration on a Future Framework,37  by 
the European Council on 25 November 2018.38 The Withdrawal Agreement provides 
for a ‘Transitional period’ until 31 December 2020, during which the 
Acquis Communautaire remains in place in the UK. Part Two of the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement contained the agreed arrangements on citizenship and Title III those on 
social security coordination. However, following three unsuccessful attempts to get 
Parliamentary approval for the Agreement she had negotiated, the Prime Minister, 
Theresa May, resigned and on 23 July 2019 Boris Johnson, who had made a 
significant contribution to the UK leaving the EU, was elected leader of the 
Conservative Party and replaced May as Prime Minister. Johnson renegotiated 
elements of the Withdrawal Agreement including the arrangements for the Irish border, 
replacing May’s Irish ‘backstop’ with a customs border between Britain and Northern 
Ireland which will leave Northern Ireland partially aligned to EU rules.39 The new 
Agreement was concluded on 17 October 2019 and signed by both parties separately 
on 24 January 2020.40  Part Two, Title III on coordination of social security, remained 
unchanged from the Agreement May had concluded in November 2018.41 
 
3.2 Perceptions of the negotiations of Part Two, Title III of the Withdrawal 
Agreement on social security coordination 
During the withdrawal negotiations the UK faced a negotiating team at the European 
Commission with a mandate from a united EU-27. This contrasted with a perception 
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among the EU-27 that the UK’s position was uncertain. Indeed, the Spanish participant 
felt that the UK negotiators had been focused on British public opinion: 
 
“Well … I have the feeling and we have the feeling in Spain that … the United Kingdom 
negotiation is not sometimes with the Union but with their own citizens, and that is the 
problem.” (Spain, 2017). 
 
The continuing uncertainty of the UK’s negotiating position was identified by the 
Austrian participant a year later in 2018: 
 
“We have the impression that within the UK there are different powers, one power 
wants more compromise, a closer relationship, while there are others who would go 
for a hard Brexit so the outcome depends very much on the developments in the UK 
and this is hard to foresee.” (Austria, 2018). 
The EU-27’s position, however, was perceived to be well prepared, well coordinated 
and unanimously supported. The Finnish participant said: 
“The negotiation was driven by the Commission and … all of the countries agreed that 
the best way forward is to stick together, a common view was taken that if we stick 
together then the negotiations won’t become fragmented.” (Finland, 2019). 
 
The Polish participant expressed a similar perspective: 
 
“We were united … from the beginning; there was a decision that we should be 
together, stick together because … in the negotiating position, especially small 
member countries towards the UK is not symmetrical, the decision was to keep a 
united approach and that was a very important lesson for all of us and as for now I 
think, all member countries are still at this position” (Poland, 2019). 
The Finnish participant explained that: 
“For social security coordination it was easy to find a common position, because it is 
such a very old and stable part of the EU law and everyone working within this sector 
knows that the best way forward is to have common rules for all of these multilateral 
situations rather than bilateral rules because that complicates everything.” (Finland, 
2019). 
Participants said that the negotiations on the social security coordination element of 
the Withdrawal Agreement were driven at a fast pace by the Commission. The 
Commission had proposed the articles that were included as Part Two, Title III in the 
March 2018 document and now form the Withdrawal Agreement, and although the 
member countries had been involved when the text was originally being prepared, the 
speed of the negotiations meant that, after that, it was not easy to influence the 
document with little room to depart from the initially agreed text. 
 
“Our experience was there was always immense time pressure, so the Commission 
tried not to give too much time to think.” (Austria, 2018). 
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“There were meetings of group of Article 50 in Brussels … the meetings … were well 
organised, but from my point of view there was not much room for discussion, many 
times it was quite fast and the agenda was full, overfull and they worked at very good 
pace.” (Poland, 2019). 
 
The UK participant expressed a similar perspective of the speed of negotiations: 
 
“Yes, because otherwise you would still be discussing this now, you would never get 
to the position that we have so far, if you’re waiting to discuss all of these wider issues 
so I think there was this time factor as well, there were certain deadlines that they had 
to meet and given that nothing was agreed from the start and it was a negotiation, it 
was give and take, although I’m not sure who gave and who took in the process, and 
it got right to the wire and therefore you’ve got no time to discuss or think about the 
consequences of what this means in the future.” (UK 2018). 
 
Participants said that they had been invited late in the day to propose changes to some 
issues and points on the proposed social security coordination arrangements which 
they thought were unclear, “because we insisted on having a possibility at least to 
have a common understanding on these provisions.” (Austria, 2018).  
 
However, while Member States were able to comment on the Guidance Note to Part 
Two, Title III on social security coordination in the March 2018 Agreement they were 
told by the Commission that there was no possibility to change the text, only to help to 
clarify the meaning: 
 
“At the meeting last week in Brussels the Commission said this is the text, and also 
confronted us with their understanding and their interpretation with concrete examples. 
However, the text is so complex that it is very difficult to apply in practice... We might 
have some possibility to add other examples if these are in line with what the 
Commission wants but it will only be if there is a really problematic issue that Member 
States might insist on a change, otherwise the Commission will say that they have a 
mandate to present to the UK.  And for the UK if this is the position of the 27 on 
interpretation it is very, very difficult for them to say we see it totally differently.” 
(Austria, 2018). 
Under the Withdrawal Agreement the UK will continue to coordinate the social security 
of people who have exercised their free movement rights before the end of the 
Transition period for at least several decades into the future. The Coordinating 
Regulations are dynamic and will continue to evolve in response to Judgments of the 
CJEU and future changes to Member States’ social security systems. With some 
exceptions to changes to the material scope and exportable benefits, the UK will have 
to apply future reform and revision of the Regulations without being able to contribute 
to those reforms. Article 34 of the Withdrawal Agreement provides for the UK to have 
a limited presence with Observer status in the Administrative Commission42 and to be 
present in an advisory role when the items on the agenda are relevant.43 Article 34 
also provides for the UK to take part in the Electronic Exchange of Social Security 
Information (EESSI)44 and to bear the related costs. Article 36 provides for the UK and 
EU to inform a Joint Committee of relevant changes to the UK’s domestic legislation 
and the Coordinating Regulations after the end of the Transition period.45 To ensure 
consistent application of the Agreement, Article 158 provides for a UK court or tribunal, 
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in a case which has commenced at first instance within eight years from the end of the 
Transition period, to request the CJEU to give a preliminary ruling on a question, the 
legal effect of which in the UK will be the same as a preliminary ruling in the Union and 
its Member States under Article 267 TFEU.46  
4 The European Commission’s 2016 proposal for reform of the Social 
Security Coordinating Regulations 
 
4.1 The proposal 
On 13 December 2016, the European Commission proposed a revision of the Social 
Security Coordinating Regulations,47 following a call from the European Parliament for 
review.48 The Commission proposed: to introduce new arrangements for 
unemployment benefits; to clarify the circumstances in which Member States can limit 
access to social benefits for economically inactive EU mobile citizens; to introduce a 
separate Chapter to establish a coherent regime for the coordination of long-term care 
benefits; to establish new provisions for the coordination of family benefits intended to 
replace income during child-raising periods, listed in Part 1 of Annex XIII of Regulation 
(EC) No. 883/2004; to strengthen the rules on social security coordination for posted 
workers in order to prevent abuse; and several reforms to improve the administration 
of the Regulations. 49   
 
The current proposal is aligned with the Labour Mobility Package to continue the 
modernisation of social security coordination proposed at the Edinburgh Council in 
1992 and introduced by Regulations (EC) No. 883/2004 and (EC) No. 987/2009 in 
2010, with the aim of “further facilitating the exercise of citizens' rights while ensuring 
legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the Member 
States and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules.” 50 
 
On 3 March 2017, the European Council held an orientation debate on the proposed 
revision of the Coordinating Regulations, at which Damian Hinds, the UK’s Minister of 
State for Employment, participated, on the basis of a Presidency Note, to brief the 
recently established Working Party. The Presidency’s Note identified a “lack of 
agreement on a series of elements and issues, including the extension of 
unemployment benefits. Indexation is a particularly contentious issue and currently 
gives rise to diverging and contrasting views. It is clear that there are various elements 
related to equal treatment and posting of workers that need further clarification.” 51 
 
A partial general approach to the Commission’s proposal, on equal treatment and 
determination of applicable legislation, was agreed by EU Employment Ministers on 
23 October 2017.52  The EPSCO Council 53 agreed its negotiating position (general 
approach) on 21 June 2018.54 The Council Presidency and the European Parliament 
reached a provisional agreement, following the Trilogue meetings.55 However, this 
was rejected at the Coreper56 meeting on 29 March 2019. The Parliament Plenary 
voted on 18 April 2019 to leave the first reading procedure open to the following 
parliamentary term with a decision taken on the October 2019 Plenary that the text is 
“unfinished business to be carried over.”57 
 
In contrast to the reforms that led to the introduction of Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 
and Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004, which required unanimity in the Council, 
agreement on the reforms proposed by the Commission in 2016 requires a qualified 
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majority and “in some situations when it was evident that there was a qualified majority 
in the Council there was quite a strong push for a compromise even though there was 
a relatively large proportion of Member States who were very strongly against…. There 
was perhaps too strong a push for a fast compromise…. For the unemployment 
chapter, for example, there has been a kind of backlash, when the compromise in 
Trilogue was perceived to have gone too far.” (Finland, 2019). 
 
4.2 “Prudent for the Government to participate fully in the negotiations” 
The UK Government is required to report progress on the negotiations on reform of 
social security coordination to the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee. 
On 8 February 2017 the European Scrutiny Committee suggested that in light of the 
European Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum58 that there was “no general 
consensus on the changes needed” concerning the restriction of benefits for persons 
who are economically inactive and that member country governments had “divergent 
views” on amending aggregation and export of unemployment benefit, there is “a 
strong likelihood that negotiations on this proposal will be protracted and demanding. 
It is in any case unlikely the new Regulation will enter into effect before the UK’s 
intended exit from the EU.”59 
 
Despite considering it unlikely that the new Regulation would enter into effect before 
the UK’s intended exit, the European Scrutiny Committee expressed concern that, in 
his report, the Minister had omitted the Government’s usual statement that it would 
continue to “negotiate, implement and apply EU legislation” until the conclusion of 
negotiations to leave the EU, and informed the Minister that the Government should 
approach the negotiations on the revision of the Coordinating Regulations as if the 
amended rules will apply to the UK, concluding with advice that:  
 
“Regulation 883/2004 (as amended) could, should the Government so wish, be 
incorporated into such an agreement subject to any modifications that were acceptable 
to the UK and EU. As such, we consider that it would be prudent for the Government 
to participate fully in the negotiations on this proposal to ensure the final legislation is 
aligned with the UK’s priorities.” 60  
 
The Committee repeated its advice to the Minister in November 2017: “for as long as 
the UK remains an EU Member State it should continue to negotiate new EU legislation 
to ensure it reflects the UK’s interests.” 61  
 
The revision of the Coordinating Regulations was discussed during several sessions 
of the Council of the European Union’s Working Party on Social Questions62 where 
prior to leaving the EU on 31 January 2020 the UK had participated fully. Participants 
said that the UK had traditionally made a strong contribution in Council Working 
Parties including, for example, during the development of Electronic Exchange of 
Social Security Information (EESSI): 
 
“The UK has continued to be active in working groups, including, for example, the 
Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information project in which they have invested 
a lot time and expertise and have continued to contribute since Article 50 was invoked.” 
(Finland, 2019). 
 
Participants felt that the UK’s participation in the negotiations indicated an: 
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“understanding in the UK that in one form or another (the UK) would be willing to apply 
these rules in the future and are trying to affect them as long as they can from the 
inside for as long as they are members and they can have a say.” (Finland, 2019). 
 
The UK participant explained: 
  
“The issue is that if we will not be applying EU law, then… how will somebody else 
accept us contributing to the shaping of that law? … We don’t expect to do that, unless 
we will continue applying it and given that we will be applying 883 is the reason why 
we said we wanted a seat at the table.” (UK, 2018). 
 
4.3  “Willingness to compromise on amendments to the social security rules 
that it considers less than ideal” 
The Council of the European Union is, alongside the European Parliament, the EU’s 
main decision-making body where government ministers from each member 
country meet to coordinate policies and reform legislation. Decisions are usually 
arrived at by consensus or by qualified majority. A qualified majority requires 55% of 
countries (16 out of 28 while the UK was still a member) to vote in favour. The 
countries voting in favour must represent 65% or more of the total EU population. At 
least four countries, representing 35% of the total EU population, are required to 
block a decision.63  Voting is, therefore, weighted by population size which means 
that larger Member States (France, Germany, Italy and the UK)64 can, if they are 
opposed to a proposal, form a blocking minority and are thus rarely outvoted by the 
other Member States.65  
During the negotiations member countries formed alliances to seek to achieve 
qualified voting majorities. However, these alliances did not map consistently across 
the different substantive issues: 
 
“You can have different alliances because of the structure of your social security 
system … or the forms of migration…There are different alliances for legislation 
applicable and unemployment benefits, so it is really, really complicated. There are 
many things on which we have a common understanding like long-term care 
benefits, family benefits and miscellaneous amendments but it is a package with two 
parts, with the legislation applicable and unemployment which are sensitive, and so 
everything has to be onboard.” (Finland, 2019). 
 
The UK participated in these alliances adopting positions on the substantive issues in 
line with its traditional positions. In his Explanatory Memorandum of 4 January 2017, 
the Minister of State for Employment (Damian Hinds) wrote to the House of Commons 
European Scrutiny Committee:  
 
“The full policy implications will only become clearer when the proposals have been 
developed further through the negotiations. In general terms however, some of the 
proposals codifying recent CJEU case law on access to benefits are considered to be 
useful clarifications which create more legal certainty and support the UK position of 
requiring a person to have a right to reside in the United Kingdom in order to access 
certain benefits as upheld by the CJEU in C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom.” 
66  
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On 22 November 2017, the Minister informed the Committee that the Estonian 
Presidency would be looking for a second partial general approach, on long-term care 
benefits and family benefits, at the 7 December EPSCO Council and explained that 
the Government was “prepared to accept the current text” as the proposed 
coordination of long-term care benefits “should not have any financial impact for the 
UK”; and as the UK does not have any family benefits intended to replace income 
during child-raising periods listed in Part 1 of Annex XIII of Regulation (EC) No. 
883/2004, there should “only be a limited financial impact”.67  
 
The UK Government had greater concerns over the Commission’s proposals to amend 
the rules for coordinating unemployment benefits. In an update to the Committee on 
24 April 2018, the Minister stated that the Government’s negotiating strategy had been 
concentrated on how to “limit the Commission’s proposals on extending the period 
during which [unemployment benefit] may be exported to another Member State, and 
reduce the administrative burden surrounding the proposals”.68  
 
The Minister explained to the Committee that the Commission’s proposals on 
unemployment benefit have been “substantially amended” as a result of discussions 
between Member States and reported that the Council is likely to seek to discard the 
extension to six months for exporting unemployment benefit while seeking work in 
another member country, as proposed by the Commission, in favour of retaining the 
existing three month statutory minimum period.69  
 
With respect to the aggregation of contributions, the Minister reported that the UK 
Government had “supported a longer waiting period than the current one day” 70 before 
contributions paid in another Member State can be used to qualify for unemployment 
benefit and informed the Committee that the Member States had compromised to 
agree a minimum qualifying period of one month rather than permitting aggregation 
after one day of employment, under the current arrangement, or three months in the 
Commission’s proposal.71 With regard to frontier workers, the Minister told the 
Committee that the Government welcomed the proposal to abolish the provisions on 
reimbursement which it considered to be “cumbersome to administer and a source of 
disagreement between the UK and other Member States”.72 
 
The Minister concluded his letter of 24 April 2018 by telling the Committee that the UK 
“has thus far secured many of its objectives for the package of reforms”.73  However, 
Ministers repeatedly stated to the Committee that the UK had needed to make 
compromises that it might not have felt the need for if it had not been leaving the EU. 
For example, on 23 May 2018, the Committee noted that the Minister “has specifically 
cited the loss of the UK’s institutional representation in March 2019 as one of the 
drivers for the Government’s willingness to compromise on amendments to the social 
security rules that it considers less than ideal, notably those allowing frontier workers 
to choose which Member State - that of employment or of residence - should pay their 
unemployment benefit.” 74 
 
The Minister wrote in his letter - with reference to frontier workers - that while the 
Government “would have preferred not to see the introduction of new circumstances 
in which individuals may opt to receive benefit paid by one [EU country] in another”, if 
the UK attempted to undo the compromise it would probably lead to the loss of the 
limitations on the export of unemployment benefit, which is one of the Government’s 
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main objectives in the negotiations, as “most [Member States] see the UB provisions 
as a package.” 75  
 
The Committee noted that “on this occasion it is likely that the UK’s full support will be 
needed in order to secure a Qualified Majority in favour of the proposal” and that “It is 
unclear whether the Regulation will still command the necessary majority among 
Member States if the vote is held after the UK’s exit.” 76 
 
With this in mind, in his letter dated 26 March 2019, the Minister for Employment (Alok 
Sharma) told the Committee, that it was “preferable for the file to be concluded whilst 
the UK retains a seat at the negotiating table and on a text which it had helped shape” 
despite not supporting all of the legal changes.77 
 
Prior to leaving the EU on 31 January 2020 the UK had enjoyed a 12.61% share of 
the vote in the Council78 which had been “the key vehicle for exercising UK power and 
influence in the EU.”79 During the negotiations on reforming the Social Security 
Coordinating Regulations, the UK had sought to play its traditional leading role as a 
big country: 
 
“The big countries have an active role because their vote counts more, and they of 
course have negotiations behind closed curtains …” (Finland, 2019). 
 
However, Brexit weakened the UK’s hand in the negotiations: 
 
“I would have expected the UK to have built a blocking minority that could stop the 
revision of 883 or the revision of the Posted Workers Directive and just such a threat 
would have a big influence including a bigger influence on the shape of provisions 
establishing European Labour Authority… My feeling is that the UK was not so 
strong during the revision of the Posted Workers Directive and the revision of 883 as 
well as establishing the European Labour Authority…. The voice of the UK was 
heard.  Positions were presented but there was no diplomatic activity like other 
Member States because I suppose there was a feeling within the UK delegation that 
we don’t know where we will be in the next, for example, six or twelve months.” 
(Poland, 2019). 
 
France and Germany led the search for common ground and compromise and 
participants felt that France would be the main beneficiary of the UK’s departure: 
 
“For example, France, Germany and Italy are stronger now and France as for now is 
a winner on Brexit because the labour mobility package is in line with many of the 
wishes and needs of France.  With regard to the situation with the unemployment 
benefits chapter, many things are in line with the position of France.” (Poland, 2019).  
 
5 Conclusion: From rule maker to rule taker 
 
On 9 April 2016, Michael Gove, the then Secretary of State for Justice and Lord High 
Chancellor of Great Britain, and a key architect of Brexit, told the UK electorate: 
 
“The day after we vote to leave, we hold all the cards and we can choose the path we 
want.”80  
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This study of the UK’s role in the simultaneous and linked negotiations of the future 
coordination of social security in the Withdrawal Agreement for people who have 
exercised their free movement rights before the end of the Transition period and the 
reform of the Coordinating Regulations in the context of Brexit finds that the UK does 
not have a strong suit of cards to play in negotiations with the EU-27. While the Minister 
claimed to have achieved many of the UK’s goals, the negotiations of the reform of the 
Coordinating Regulations show that the UK’s influence is waning as it steps back from 
its role constructing and leading alliances leaving France and Germany to lead the 
search for workable compromises. The irony is that a key stated aim of Brexit is to 
“take back control”.81 Control implies agency, and this study finds that in the case of 
social security coordination, the UK has achieved the opposite as the window to shape 
the Coordinating Regulations that - unless the UK leaves without a deal – it will operate 
under the Withdrawal Agreement for several decades into the future has closed and a 
country that has been an influential rule maker at the heart of EU policy making for 
almost half a century metamorphoses into a rule taker.  
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